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Abstract: 
Bank deposits have two characteristics: they are available on demand and at par value. Deposit 
redemptions face, at least given current technology, a lag between when they are requested and 
when they are delivered. This fact leads some to argue that as a deposit is not fully available, all 
deposits are, in fact, loans and that the legal obligation of the bank changes. We argue that this 
lag does not nullify the original economic intent of the deposit, and hence, does not alter the 
legal obligations that a depository faces. Deposits must be held safely to ensure that the 
depositor´s money will be available when an unforeseen event occurs. 
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The Economic and Legal Significance of “Full” Deposit Availability 
 
There are two angles to assess the desirability of fractional reserve banking. On the one hand, the 
stability of such a system is concerned with what deposit reserve ratio is optimal.1 On the other 
hand, legal or ethical considerations are used to assess whether the practice of holding fractional 
reserves against demand deposits is justifiable.2   
 
Central to both angles is the question of whether funds placed in a deposit account represent a 
loan or a deposit. One strand of literature treats deposits as legally distinct from loans, implying a 
difference in obligation as well (Huerta de Soto 2006; Bagus and Howden 2009). One key 
obligation is that the depository must keep the good fully available to the depositor. Another 
strand of the literature treats loans and deposits as indistinct, with no real distinctions at the 
margin (Rozeff 2010; Yeager 2010). In this argument, deposits are a type of loan to a bank (more 
correctly stated as a time deposit), with only gradual differences in their availability. One key 
point of separation between the two contracts is that the waiting time for delivery of the demand 
deposit is very short, while it can extend considerably for a time deposit. As deposits and loans 
only differ by degree of liquidity and availability, the same legal rules apply to both; as time 
deposits can be lent out, so too can deposits.   
 
In this paper we address the puzzle of whether deposit availability is indeed a distinctive problem 
in banking. Specifically we answer two questions: How available must a demand deposit be? 
                                                 
1
 Defenses of fractional reserve free banking are found in  George Selgin (1988), Kevin Dowd (1989), David 
Glasner (1989), Lawrence White (1984; 1989), and Leland Yeager (1997). The economic case for 100 percent 
banking is made by Hoppe (1994), Hülsmann (1996), Huerta de Soto (2006) and Bagus and Howden (2011; 2012a). 
2
 Michael Rozeff (2010), Selgin (1988), Selgin and White (1996), White (1989) and Yeager (2010) make the ethical 
and legal case in favor of fractional reserve free banking. The opposing viewpoint which regards fractional reserve 
banking as legally and ethically problematic is made in Bagus and Howden (2009), William Barnett and Walter 
Block  (2005), Hans Hermann Hoppe (1994), Hoppe, Jörg Guido Hülsmann and Block (1998), Jesús Huerta de Soto 
(2006), and Hülsmann (1996, 2008). 
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How available can a demand deposit be? On these two seemingly innocuous questions hinge 
great consequences for the modern banking system.  
 
 
The financial crisis and stability of fractional reserve banking 
 
The current European (and American) banking crises seems to have one root firmly planted in 
the practice of fractional reserve banking supervised by central banks. One relevant question that 
is being asked is whether the benefits of such a system outweigh its now apparent costs. 
Fractional reserve banking systems economize on reserves, thus offering banks cost savings. 
They also provide a service to lenders, as banks acting as intermediaries assess the risk of 
multiple borrowers, saving depositors from this task (Diamond 1984), or by offering 
“commoditized” financial products by homogenizing risk factors (Benston and Smith 1976). As 
demand deposits often lay unclaimed in accounts, banks take advantage of this apparent idleness 
to create loans for productive gain. This practice not only provides credit to entrepreneurs and 
profits to banks, but also reduces the cost of maintaining accounts for depositors.3  
 
While these benefits accrue mostly unnoticed, there are significant and noticeable costs that arise 
periodically. The most apparent are the costs of dealing with unstable banks – those that have 
lent deposits to borrowers who are now unable to pay, and thus imperil the original depositor’s 
                                                 
3
 Note that in full-reserve banking systems, depositors would have to reimburse banks for the service of 
safeguarding their funds, as was the case in some historical examples such as the Bank of Amsterdam (Adam Smith 
1776, volume 2: 74). Alternatively, banks could offer deposit accounts for free of or at a reduced charge, taking a 
loss in order to generate additional business (Bagus and Howden 2009: 400fn5; Bagus et al forthcoming: fn5). 
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recourse to his money.4  
 
Solutions to this instability have come in varied forms. Traditionally the nature of the deposit 
contract is central to discussions on bank regulation (Bhattacharya et al. 1998), in part because 
this specific contract leaves fractional-reserve banks exposed to destabilizing withdrawals. While 
the preferred solutions by global central banks have more recently revolved around reactive 
measures aimed at recapitalizing illiquid banks, deeper issues are at stake, and alternative 
solutions exist.  
 
Laurence Kotlikoff (2010) suggests reforming the banking industry among limited lines – 
deposits in banks will be backed by reserves invested in safe government bonds or money market 
mutual funds, while loan and investment activities will not.5 Huerta de Soto (2006: chap. 9) goes 
one step further, calling for a full separation of banking activities – with deposit banks existing 
independently of their investment counterparts (and operating with separate reserve requirements 
as well).In both cases a shift towards backing the deposit base with an increase in liquid reserves 
is seen as a desirable and stabilizing force.6  
 
The similarity in both Kotlikoff’s and Huerta de Soto’s plans is the recognition that the reserve 
                                                 
4
 Robert Eisenbeis and Larry Wall (2002) assess the failures in regulatory agencies and weigh the costs and benefits 
of bank regulation, specifically in the area of deposit insurance. High deposit insurance premia guard against bank 
failures, but draw the ire of bankers who perceive that they are overpaying for the service, or being forced to insure 
more than they otherwise would. Lower premia satisfy the banking establishment, but leave the general public open 
to ex post losses either through bank insolvency or public sector bailouts.  
5
 O´Driscoll (2010) criticizes Kotlikoff´s plan for prohibiting necessary leverage in banking, and convincingly 
argues that a prohibition of bailouts would be sufficient to limit leverage in the financial services industry.  He also 
points to the overregulation issues that Kotlikoff´s plan entails, focusing on the risk of capturing the regulator.  
6
 Along similar lines, but more concerned with the base money regime, is O´Driscoll´s (2009) monetary reform plan. 
While recommending a commodity to replace fiat money as the base money standard, O´Driscoll does not touch 
upon reserve requirements as a source of banking sector instability.  
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regime a bank operates under – whether full or fractional – is essential in establishing the 
stability of the larger system.  
 
 Full reserves, commonly eschewed due to the high costs entailed, do have the benefit of 
allowing deposits to be redeemed upon request, one of their key characteristics. By not keeping a 
full reserve on hand to back its deposit base, the bank exposes itself to a reserve-draining run on 
its assets. In order to stem such runs on reserves, Economists since Walter Bagehot (1873) have 
recommended having a lender of last resort fund illiquid but solvent banking institutions when 
runs threaten capital.7 While this ex post solution rectifies the apparent problem of 
undercapitalized banks, it does little to remove the incentive that breeds the bank run under 
fractional-reserve systems. An ex ante solution is the use of an insurance fund to remove the 
incentive for depositors to doubt the availability of their deposit, thus disincentivizing reserve-
draining runs (as in Diamond and Dybvig 1983). Deposit insurance came into widespread use in 
the 20th century, especially as a response to Great Depression era bank runs. Indeed, much 
regulation of the banking industry (as distinct from other industries) has come to be seen as 
necessary if only to evade negative externalities resulting from government-imposed deposit 
insurance plans (Benston and Kaufman 1996; Kaufman 1996). 
 
The deposit insurance solution rectifies the apparent problem of the run, though introduces new 
ones. Foremost among these is the moral hazard that deposit insurance creates. Removing the 
threat of depositor losses also removes the impetus for these depositors to monitor the liquidity 
                                                 
7
 Although traditionally the lender of last resort only lent to illiquid but solvent institutions, Kaufman (1999) finds 
that during the United States’ S&L crisis in the 1980s, over 90 percent of all emergency lending from the Federal 
Reserve went to institutions that subsequently failed. Kaufman holds that private institutions are better able to assess 
whether a bank is solvent and lend accordingly, a difficulty that central banks lacking a hard budget constraint face. 
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positions of their bank. Banks have a tendency to partake in riskier lending, and less prudent 
asset management (Clifford Thies and Daniel Gerlowski (1989) provide historical evidence to 
this end, while Bert Ely (1999) looks at the broader theoretical issues at stake with mandated 
deposit insurance plans). The proverbial can is kicked down the road an additional time as the 
moral hazard of banking insurance is solved through a regulatory agency, usually the Treasury or 
central bank.8  
 
One important body of literature addresses these issues and allows for the banking system to 
endogenously create solutions to them. The “fractional-reserve free banking” literature sees a 
fractional-reserve banking system evolving with no specific state-sponsored lender of last resort 
or supervising agency (Selgin 1988; White 1992; Selgin and White 1996). The fractional-reserve 
banking system is self-regulating and efficient (O´Driscoll and Hoskins 2006). Banks alter their 
reserve base as per changes in the demand to hold money by depositors (a greater demand to 
hold money implies fewer redemption requests, increasing the portion of reserves being 
“unused” and available to be lent out). Banks issue money substitutes, or claims to their reserves, 
with depositors and other banks monitoring their stability. Should a bank run occur, solutions 
come in two forms. First, since banks can issue money substitutes, borrowing reserves from 
liquid banks with a promise to pay in the future can satisfy the redemption demands by 
depositors. Second, legal stipulations can be built into the deposit contract limiting the time and 
extent of redemptions, as was the case in the 19th century Scottish free-banking experiment with 
“option clauses” (Selgin and White 1997).9  
                                                 
8
 More recently the IMF has assessed the moral hazard aspects of deposit insurance, especially in the role of 
institutionalized risk taking in explicitly defined and guaranteed plans (McCoy 2007). 
9
 Deposit insurance plans are often preferred to the suspension of convertibility, though this insurance comes at a 
cost of its own through the distorted incentive structure altering depositor behavior, and the creation of moral hazard 
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Although the fractional-reserve free banking literature provides a plausible explanation for a self-
stabilizing banking system built upon fractional reserves, doubts remain. Charles Goodhart 
(1988) gives an historical account of the emergence of central banking as a response to profit 
maximizing free banks operating with fractional reserves and seeing a profit opportunity through 
credit expansion that could only be maintained through a coordinating agency – the central bank. 
Bagus and Howden (2012a) provide theoretical and historical evidence that free banking systems 
evolved into their more common centralized counterparts of today due to the instabilities that 
they bred through credit expansion beyond what their deposit base could service. The resultant 
liquidity-constrained economic contractions incentivized both bankers and depositors to seek out 
solutions to halt deposit suspensions, typically in the form of a liquidity-guaranteeing central 
bank. As the fractional-reserve free banking system is only stable as long as it remains outside of 
the perverse incentives of the central banking led regime, the incentive to evolve into such a 
system brings its stability into question. 
 
While the economic debate on fractional reserves has been vivid revived recently, the legal 
debate is also advancing the discussion to new horizons. Most prevalent among these legal issues 
is the question of whether there are distinctive features for deposits and loans that imply different 
legal obligations for these institutions. Chief among these is the availability of a deposit that 
forms the legal obligation for a depository to abide by.  
 
How Available Must Deposits Be? 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
increasing bank risk and potential taxpayer liability (Bhattacharya et al. 1998). 
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The question of how available must a deposit be is not as normative as one may suppose. By 
applying objective legal theory to the question, we arrive at an answer that is central to the 
fractional reserve/100 percent reserve banking debate.10 
 
To answer the question one must first assess the very reason why an individual makes a deposit. 
The demand to hold money – held via cash or bank demand deposit accounts – fundamentally 
arises from our uncertainty as to future expenditures. Unaware of when, why, where or what his 
future expenditures will be, an individual saves a portion of his savings as money to mitigate this 
future uncertainty (Ludwig von Mises 1949: 249). Indeed, money savings become the means 
individuals use to mitigate the most primal of their needs, the desire to reduce uncertainty (Mises 
1949: 14).11  
 
Many individuals desiring to hold large cash balances consider it neither safe nor convenient to 
hold the sum in cash. Banks originally developed as warehouses to hold deposited money until 
the time arose when a depositor demanded to use his deposit. The demand deposit formed, the 
essential feature of which was to ensure that the deposited sum would be available at some future 
unknown time. From the subjective point of view, the depositor increases the future availability 
of his money by depositing it. He makes the deposit because he regards the bank as a safer and 
more convenient place for his money than an alternative place (under his mattress, for example). 
A demand deposit increases the subjectively perceived availability of the deposit. If the aim is to 
                                                 
10
 The interested reader may consult Jesús Huerta de Soto (2006: chap. 1), Philipp Bagus and David Howden (2009), 
or Bagus et al. (forthcoming) for a comprehensive overview of the objective legal principles in question. 
11
 Note that in modern monetary economics, the demand to hold cash balances comes (primarily) from two factors – 
income and the interest rate on interest-bearing assets. Yet these factors are only consequences or constraints on the 
demand to hold cash balances to mitigate uncertainty (Mises 1949: 404). The interest offered on “safe” interest 
bearing bonds does not condition our decision to hold a certain quantity of money in our cash balances. It is our 
demand to hold a cash balance to mitigate future uncertainty that determines what interest rate these bonds will bear 
(Murray N. Rothbard 1962: 787-89).  
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mitigate uncertainty of the future, the safekeeping of the deposit becomes the central means to 
accomplish this goal. 
 
One objection that arises at this point pertains to whether an individual desires his deposited sum 
to be fully available or whether he is potentially willing to sacrifice some of this availability for a 
reduction in costs or availability (i.e., by making a time deposit, or more correctly stated, a loan). 
We may appreciate at this juncture that uncertainty cannot be reduced through taking on 
additional uncertainty. The individual has made a deposit to “insure” against an unknown future 
expenditure. Making the deposit less than certain is not an option to the depositor – it annuls the 
original goal sought.12  
 
Another objection that arises pertains to what differentiates a deposit from a loan. While deposits 
must be fully available on demand, some loans can closely approximate this availability if their 
maturity is short enough. Barnett and Block (2011: 230) ask, for example: 
 
[W]hat is the relevant time period that separates a loan from a deposit? For example, A 
wishes to establish an account with B in which A turns money over to B with the 
expectation that B will later on return it to A. If the term of the contract requires that A, 
upon making a demand for the return of his funds, may be required to wait before they 
                                                 
12
 This becomes clearer if we ask the simple question as to why an individual would choose a demand deposit over a 
time deposit, or investing in a highly liquid bond. If the individual was not concerned with full availability than the 
latter options would be suitable substitutes for the former. The fact that individuals utilize demand deposit accounts 
suggests that they do find the options distinct. Likewise the objection that if a depositor was concerned with 
safekeeping he would make use of a safety deposit box rather than a demand deposit in the modern banking system 
is not sound. For only if the former were seen as a good substitute for the latter would this reasoning be correct. The 
fact that a safety deposit box cannot offer the availability of a demand deposit and is more costly (economies of 
scale apply when deposits are held in big vaults) makes them poor substitutes for each other (Bagus et al. 
forthcoming). 
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are returned, does this render the contract a time deposit? Suppose the waiting period to 
be 1 seconds? [sic.] 5 seconds? 10 seconds? What is the maximum period of contractually 
allowed delay between demand and return that still qualifies the relation as a deposit and 
not a loan? 
 
 
The fact that as the maturity of a loan continually shortens it increasingly approximates a deposit 
does not make it a deposit. Each contract has its own characteristics. The most important 
characteristic for the task at hand is the contract´s maturity. Loans must have some, at least 
implicit, maximum maturity before which it must be repaid (Huerta de Soto 2009: 1-6). A “loan” 
without a maturity, one which is never to be repaid (i.e., a maturity of infinity), is a gift. A “loan” 
that is due (or potentially due) the instant that it is made cannot be considered a loan by any use 
of the word. It is equivalent to a demand deposit and should be considered as such. A loan allows 
the borrower the use of the loaned object over its duration – a loan that is continually on demand 
can never be used as the lender could at any point in time ask for its return – the borrower would 
have to keep the object on hand to satisfy this redemption demand. Loans that may be called “on 
demand” are what we know and identify today as deposits.13 
 
One final objection must be addressed before moving on. Money is fungible. A deposit does not 
have to be repaid in the same monetary units, but rather must only be settled with its tantumdem 
– an equivalent quality and quantity of money units. Does it not follow that a borrower of a 
                                                 
13
 The problem of the current (and long-running) fashion of calling short-term loans “time deposits” becomes 
evident in light of the contractual differences between deposits and loans. Eliminating such confusing terminology 
would do much to reduce error on the theoretical side by economists (Mises 1949: 403). Likewise, eliminating such 
terminology would do much to erase the practical ambiguities plaguing the current banking system (Bagus and 
Howden 2009: 401fn8). 
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deposit is at liberty to make use of the deposit to make loans, investments, or otherwise purchase 
assets, provided that he can unwind these positions and use the cash proceeds to settle the 
original deposit? This objection too misses a key point, and takes us full circle back to our 
original argument.14 
 
An individual holds a cash balance, or makes a deposit in a banking institution, because he is 
uncertain of his future expenditures. The original goal was to keep his savings warehoused to be 
as continually and fully available as possible. Only in this way would his uncertainty concerning 
future expenditures be mitigated –the assurance that a stock of money was available at any time 
would guard against the unforeseeable events of the future. 
 
The problem that arises for the depository is that it knows neither the time nor the place that the 
depositor will claim his deposit. Indeed, the depositor himself does not know these valuable 
pieces of information. Lacking this knowledge the depository cannot make use of the deposit 
under the pretense that it will be able to honor the deposit by unwinding an offsetting financial 
position in the future when a redemption demand is placed. Recent events over the past three 
years (and indeed over the whole recorded history of the fractional reserve banking system) have 
retold the unfortunate consequences of assuming that the redemption demands can be accurately 
forecast in advance.  
 
                                                 
14
 We refrain here from commenting on whether such a transaction would really honor the original tantundem. While 
it is clear that it is possible that such a transaction would potentially result in the same quantity of monetary units 
being returned to the depositor, it is less clear if the monetary units will be of the same quality. In making a loan -
against a deposit, the core practice of the fractional-reserve banking system, the value of each individual deposited 
monetary unit is diminished. In other words, while the quantity of deposited notes can be, in most cases, easily 
returned to the depositor, their individual quality may be purposefully reduced in quality by the depository. Rothbard 
(1962: 765) discusses the differences in social benefit between increasing the supply of consumers’ goods as 
opposed to increasing the supply of money. 
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In both fractional reserve scenarios – whether free or centralized – the root problem that emerges 
is how illiquid assets can honor a deposit base that is redeemable on demand. Recourse is often 
taken in an estimate of the average redemption demands placed on the bank, or the length of time 
the deposits are entrusted with the bank. Yet the depositor himself knows not these things (which 
explains the original impetus for placing his money in a demand deposit), and this precludes the 
possibility of the depository forecasting such redemption demands. In addition, circumstances 
exogenous to the banking system alter a depositors’ level of perceived uncertainty – wars and 
natural disasters spring to mind – and the banking system itself can change its depositors’ 
demand to hold money endogenously (Bagus and Howden 2011). By collateralizing loans with 
deposits, banking institutions affect the interest rate offered on such loans, hence altering an 
individual’s demand to hold a cash balance. To forecast redemption demands accurately, banks 
would have to foresee not only those effects they have no control of and which are exogenous to 
them, but also those effects that they have control of and are endogenously created by them.15  
 
Fully backing a deposit is one way that the bank can eliminate all of these aforementioned 
problems. Unable to forecast redemption demands in advance accurately, banks have difficulty in 
estimating what level of reserves is appropriate. Bank runs can be solved through regulatory 
actions – deposit insurance, typically – but at the cost of skewing incentives and enticing banks 
to take on riskier portfolios. Banks can effectively monitor themselves under a free-banking 
regime, though the ability of this regime to not evolve into a centralized system (complete with 
its own stability issues, as recent history attests) questions whether this is an effective long-term 
                                                 
15
 Even if the bank could forecast redemption demands accurately, the appropriation and use of the money would 
represent a violation of the safekeeping obligation. An analogous case arises if your friend entrusts you to watch 
their car to keep it safe while they go on vacation. If you make use of the car while your friend is away, even if they 
are unaware of your use of the car (and assuming that the car is not damaged), a break of fiduciary duty has 
occurred. In both cases an unethical use of goods transpires. 
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solution.  
 
One solution is found in altering the nature of the demand deposit contract. If bank stability is 
threatened by an inability to meet redemption requests on demand, stability can be promoted by 
eliminating the “on demand” portion. Unfortunately, such a reassignment of contractual rights 
would fundamentally alter the reason that the contract was entered into originally. Depositors 
require a cash balance to mitigate their uncertainty concerning the future. Demand deposits are 
how depositors economize on their cash holdings while simultaneously promoting the security 
and availability of their savings. In this way, deposits must be available on demand in order to 
satisfy the very reason that the depositor formed the contract.  
 
 
How Available Can Deposits Be? 
 
If deposits must be fully and continually available on demand in the legal sense, we must assess 
whether there are any operative constraints on this requirement. It is true that, at least in the 
modern banking system, there is almost always a time lag between when a deposit is requested, 
and when the bank can physically honor its obligation. This lag arises for three reasons. 
 
First, identity verification must confirm that the individual requesting a deposit is the true deposit 
holder. As a deposit exists to provide safe storage, the deposit holder must at all times succumb 
to some time-consuming security measure to ensure the identities of the requestor and deposit 
holder match. 
14 
 
 
Second, there will necessarily be some amount of time between when identity is confirmed and 
when the requestor will receive the deposit in question (or, in the case of electronic transactions, 
the use of the deposit in question). Note that this constraint arises from the same source as in the 
above case of identification. As the bank’s role is to safeguard the deposited sum, some amount 
of time will almost certainly be necessary to move the deposit (whether physically in kind, or 
electronically in title) from a safe location and into the depositor’s possession.  
  
Third, there may be institutional restrictions on deposit availability, such as business hours. A 
bank may be (and often is) closed during night and weekends. The fact that depositors still use 
these deposit accounts, constrained as they are by business hours, signifies that the perceived 
availability of the deposit is unhampered. The depositor would not have made the deposit if this 
institutional restriction was relevant to him and impaired his perception of availability.  
 
Note that these three time lags represent physical constraints on the transaction. They are 
problems that arise solely in practice, and pose no theoretical difficulty to distinguishing a 
deposit from a loan. Indeed, the banking system has continually strove to increase the physical 
availability of its deposits whether via tokens, checks, electronic transfers, and, more recently, 
debit transactions.  
 
The necessity of this temporal constraint in no way confuses the issue as to whether a deposit is 
actually a loan given that the bank cannot physically return it “on demand.” These waiting 
periods of are not negations of the deposit contract’s existence – a feature that would 
15 
 
automatically nullify the obligations inherent in it and instead impose the more lenient 
obligations that the loan contract requires. There is nothing deficient with the contracts at hand – 
their obligations are, after all, easily definable in theory.  
 
Still, what of the practical problem of the gray area that exists where a deposit approximates a 
loan due to the physical constraints imposed on us by our current redemption technology? In 
response to this ambiguity, it is necessary to determine which of the two contracts is operative.  
We know that every money unit must necessarily be owned by someone in the economy at every 
moment in time (Mises 1949: 402; Rothbard 1962: 760). If contracts are vague in delineating 
whether the money was properly deposited (and hence the use remains with the depositor) or lent 
(in which case the use transfers to the borrower), what is necessary is not to claim all monetary 
contracts as loans. What is instead necessary is a system of adjudication to decide what the 
operative contract is. 
 
For economic concepts that prove vague in practice, a properly functioning legal system 
becomes necessary to decide which end of the conceptual spectrum the particular concept lays 
(Barnett and Block 2008, Bagus and Howden 2012b: 296). In the case of deposit contracts that 
approximate loan contracts due to physical constraints on their redemption availability, the legal 
system must decide if the contract more closely resembles a deposit or a loan. As in most legal 
cases, the key deciding factor becomes the intent of the involved parties.  
 
For “loans” so short that the legal system assesses them as deposits (the theoretical very-short-
term loans of one minute, or even one second discussed in Barnett and Block (2011)), the 
16 
 
purpose of the “loan” may be viewed as the safekeeping of the deposit. Objectors may state that 
by offering these very-short-term loans, banks will be able to skirt the legal requirements 
imposed by the deposit contract by offering something very nearly like one, yet that entails the 
less restrictive obligations of a loan. When posed with such a motive, a well-functioning legal 
system must assess the intent behind the action. The assessment of intent once again must return 
to the original impetus that drove the depositor to give his money to the bank in the first place. 
The uncertainty surrounding future expenditures creates the need for the individual to ensure a 
safe deposit of money to shield him from unforeseen events. Banks cannot evade the simple fact 
that an integral part of this end is a safely stored deposit, readily available – fully and continually 
– for the depositor. 
 
While a legal system capable of foreseeing in advance all problematic areas of the deposit/loan 
contract continuum is likely not possible, it is also not without recourse. Evolutionary legal 
systems, such as those laid forth in Bruno Leoni (1961) or Friedrich A. Hayek (1973), are able to 
offer continual conflict resolution of this continuum problem. Terms on “loans” so short that they 
are deemed equivalent to deposits will be treated as such before the law.16  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
By analyzing the reason for the deposit of cash, we have answered an essential question: how 
                                                 
16
 Interestingly, the deposit/loan continuum is asymmetric. While it is easy to see how a continual shortening of the 
maturity of a loan causes it to approximate a deposit, a deposit can never commence to approximate a loan. Lacking 
any maturity – or, being continually redeemable on demand – removes any possibility that a deposit could ever be 
misconstrued in this regard for a loan. 
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available must a deposit be? Unable to forecast all of his future expenditure requirements, an 
individual mitigates this uncertain aspect by keeping a store of money – the liquid asset par 
excellence – at the ready for any contingencies. A banking system offering deposits provides 
individuals with one way to mitigate this future uncertainty. The quick answer to the question of 
“how available must a deposit be”, is: fully and continually. 
 
The practical answer is a little more complicated. How available can a deposit be? Physical 
constraints make it unlikely that a bank can offer a deposit that is both fully and continually 
available for a depositor to use. The time required for account holder identification, deposit 
verification, or to move a deposit from a safe location and into the depositor’s possession implies 
that a deposit cannot be physically available as what we would consider “on demand.”  
 
This simple fact does not negate the contractual obligations of the depository. Instead of 
concluding that since a deposit cannot be fully available – i.e., cannot be physically available in 
the theoretical sense we ascribe to the term “deposit” – that its contractual obligation of being 
safely held by a depository is nullified, we must instead assess its original purpose and intent. 
Depositories are not at liberty to make use of a deposit during the period when they are 
physically constrained from returning them to a depositor “on demand” (i.e., banks may not 
change the contractual obligations of a deposit to those of a loan due to physical constraints). The 
original deposit was made for a strict reason – to have a safe quantity of money available for 
unforeseen future contingencies. A bank, in accepting this deposit contract, is bound to honor to 
the best of its ability the obligation of full availability, while strictly honoring the safekeeping 
portion of the obligation. 
18 
 
 
If a depositor cannot be assured of what his future expenditures will be, he can at least take 
solace in knowing that he has a sum of money safely stored to mitigate this uncertainty. We 
conclude that availability is a valid and decisive feature differentiating deposits and loans. The 
deposit contract – the safekeeping with full and continual availability of something (money as 
the case may be) – is the means used to achieve the goal of mitigating felt uncertainty. 
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